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• The crisis has had a similar impact on most European countries and the US: a persis-
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experience of the emerging countries of Asia and Latin America.
• Productivity improvement was immediate in the US, but Europe hoarded labour and
productivity improvements were in general delayed. Southern European countries
have hardly adjusted so far.
• There is a negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth, and without effec-
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including industrial policies, should be considered.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the twentieth century it was common to joke
that ‘Brazil is a country of the future, and always
will be’. In the same way it is tempting to say that
growth is Europe’s agenda for the future, and
always will be. This goal has been emphasised as
a priority at least since the 1980s, and it seems
that each decade makes it even more elusive.
It was therefore bold for the Polish presidency of
the EU Council to put economic growth at the core
of its agenda (Polish Presidency, 2011), and it
was brave for the World Bank to undertake an in-
depth examination of the 'lustre' of European
growth (Gill and Raiser, 2011). Both should be
congratulated on their initiatives, because growth
in Europe is both more important and more diffi-
cult to achieve than at any point in recent
decades.
The reasons why restoring growth has become
paramount are not hard to grasp. Until the global
crisis, Europe’s disappointing growth performance
could be seen as a merely relative concern vis-à-
vis more successful countries. It meant that the
continent would not reach the US level of GDP per
capita, but it enjoyed already high living stan-
dards, and benefited from longer holidays and ear-
lier retirement. As Olivier Blanchard (2004) put it
in a (controversial) paper, Europe’s lower income
per head was perhaps the result of a social choice.
Furthermore, as pointed out in the World Bank
report, Europe was successful in fostering the
catching up of its least developed areas, where
there was the most pressing need for growth.
The global crisis has however altered this benign
‘Without growth, Europe is at risk of struggling permanently with debt sustainability and it is at
the mercy of stagnation and a debt overhang. Without growth the sustainability of the (already
precarious) European social model would be further brought into question.’
landscape in three fundamental ways:
• First, growth is of utmost importance for both
public and private deleveraging and for reduc-
ing the fragility of the banking sector. History
shows that in addition to growth and fiscal con-
solidation, previous rounds of financial repres-
sion, inflation, and occasional default helped
achieve the deleveraging of the public sector.
Europe does not want to have to fall back on the
latter three. Without growth, Europe is at risk of
struggling permanently with debt sustainabil-
ity and it is at the mercy of stagnation and a
debt overhang. Without growth the sustainabil-
ity of the (already precarious) European social
model would be further brought into question. 
• Second, the convergence machine has brutally
stopped in the southern part of the EU – and
has moved into reverse in Greece, Portugal and
Spain, with little chance of short-term improve-
ment. Italy, meanwhile, has been falling behind
since the early 1990s.
• Third, the euro-area sovereign debt crisis may
put Europe at risk of being seen by investors as
a place where there are very few reasons to
invest. This may trigger an accelerated weak-
ening of its economic performance.
It is of the highest importance to assess the
seriousness of these threats and the possible
policy responses. With this goal in mind and with
a focus on the medium term, this paper is
organised as follows: in section 2, we explain why
we think growth should now be given higher
priority; in section 3 we investigate if the seeds of
future growth have been sown during the
recession; in section 4 we discuss the policy
responses. Section 5 concludes.
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To simplify matters, we use throughout this paper
five country groups as the basis for discussion of
the diverse challenges. The Appendix presents the
classification.
2 WHY GROWTH IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT
2.1 Overall performance
After the second world war, European countries
embarked on a rapid convergence with the US in
terms of GDP per capita (Figure 1). This was in
part based on the rebuilding of the capital stock
lost during the war, in part on technological catch-
ing-up and in part on economic integration efforts. 
By the late 1970s, however, convergence with the
US has stopped in most countries of 'older' Europe
– though with significant exceptions, such as Ire-
land. Countries in the North (Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, Ireland, United Kingdom; see Appendix)
and South (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) groups
in particular had apparently settled for levels cor-
responding to 80 percent and 60 percent of US
GDP per capita. The central and eastern countries
by contrast were catching up from the mid-1990s,
though from a much lower base.
Figure 1 also shows IMF projections up to 2016
suggesting that the positions of the West and
North country groups relative to the US should
remain broadly stable, while southern Europe is
expected to fall behind and the convergence of the
Central and East groups is projected to continue
1. By 2016, the relative
position of the East group is
forecast to reach only pre-
transition level. Note that
data for the late 1980s and
early 1990s should be
interpreted with caution
given the differences in
statistical methodology,
changes in relative prices,
and measurement errors.
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Figure 1: GDP per capita at PPP (US = 100),
1950-2016
Source: Bruegel using data from the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook September 2011, PENN World Tables and EBRD.
Note: median values are shown.
(after the major shock of recent years in the latter
case)1.
Judging from Figure 1 it seems that the potential
for natural catching-up with the US has been
exhausted in three of the five groups, and the gap
remains noteworthy. Only significant economic
reforms and/or a change in social preferences
would lead to a change in this diagnosis.
Europe should not only look at the US but also the
new emerging powers. Figure 1 also underlines
the extremely rapid development of China, and
shows that smaller countries in Asia and Latin
America are also converging.
But there is also some good news. As Figure 2
shows, western European countries are closer to
the US in terms of GDP per hour worked, with Bel-
gium and the Netherlands even at US level. From
the North group, Ireland is only three percent below.
Therefore, these European countries were able to
catch-up with the US in terms of productivity; lower
per capita output is in part a reflection of social
preferences (more leisure), and in some cases
higher unemployment. The four South group coun-
tries have mixed records in this respect: Spain and
Italy are closer to the US than Greece and Portugal.
2.2 Deleveraging
The period in the run-up to the crisis was
characterised by a rapid increase in private debt in
several countries, such as the Baltic countries,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, while
West North South Central East
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Figure 2: GDP per hour worked and per capita at
PPP (US = 100), 2010
Source: Bruegel using data from the OECD (all but GDP per
hour for four Eastern countries apart from Estonia) and
Eurostat (GDP per hour for four Eastern countries).
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2. McKinsey (2010)
assessed the likelihood of
deleveraging in five EU
countries (among others).
Concerning the household
sector, they found high
probability for Spain and the
UK, but low probability for
Germany, France and Italy.
In the case of the non real-
estate corporate sector the
likelihood of deleveraging is
low in the UK and France,
moderate in Germany and
Italy, and mixed in Spain.
3. According to Reinhart,
Kirkegaard and Sbrancia
(2011), “financial repres-
sion occurs when govern-
ments implement policies
to channel to themselves
funds that in a deregulated
market environment would
go elsewhere”. At the cur-
rent juncture, these authors
and Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011) foresee a revival of
financial repression –
including more directed
lending to government by
captive domestic audiences
(such as pension funds),
explicit or implicit caps on
interest rates, and tighter
regulation on cross-border
capital movements. 
in many other countries, private debt
accumulation was less pronounced, such as in
Austria, the Czech Republic and Germany. In most
of Europe, public debt ratios (as a percent of GDP)
were generally stable or slowly declining. Some
countries, such as Ireland, Spain and Bulgaria had
even achieved sizeable debt reductions.
The post-crisis landscape is very different. Public
debt ratios in the EU have increased by 20 per-
centage points on average, and in some cases
they have reached alarming levels. At the same
time market tolerance of high public debt has
diminished severely, especially for the members
of the euro area. The challenge of public delever-
aging is therefore paramount. At the same time,
several European countries face the challenge of
bringing down household or corporate debt2.
Let us start with public debt. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011) summarise five major ways in which high
debt ratios were reduced in past episodes of
deleveraging:
i Economic growth;
ii Substantial fiscal adjustment, such as auster-
ity plans;
iii Explicit default or restructuring of public and/or
private sector debt;
iv A sudden surprise burst in inflation (which
reduce the real value of the debt);
v A steady dose of financial repression3 accom-
panied by an equally steady dose of inflation.
Of these, economic growth is by far the most
benign. There are three main channels through
which it aids deleveraging in both the public and
private sectors:
• First, higher growth results in higher govern-
ment primary balances and higher private
sector incomes – which can be used to pay off
the debt.
• Second, higher growth results in a reduction of
the relative burden of past debt accumulation.
Other things being equal, a one percentage
point acceleration of the growth rate reduces
the required primary surplus by one-hundredth
of the debt ratio. With the debt ratio approach-
ing or in certain cases exceeding 100 percent
of GDP, this is a meaningful effect. 
• Third, by improving sustainability, higher
growth makes future threats to solvency less
probable and for this reasons it is likely to result
in lower risk premia. It is not by accident that
the potential growth outlook is often mentioned
by market participants and rating agencies as
a key factor in their solvency assessments.
Box 1 illustrates the point by decomposing factors
behind the impressively fast reduction of the UK
general government and the US federal debt ratios
in the first three post-war decades. Growth and pri-
mary surpluses made sizeable contributions to
deleveraging, and primary surpluses were partly
the result of growth. There were several years with
negative real interest rates (and whenever the real
interest rate was positive, it was small) which also
helped deleveraging.  As pointed out by Reinhart
and Sbrancia (2011), financial repression was
the major reason for low real interest rates. 
Another reason why public debt deleveraging, and
hence growth, is paramount is that without it the
European social model is not sustainable. This was
observed by Sapir et al (2004) and is a major
reason why they advocated an agenda for a
growing Europe.
Turning to the private side, credit developments
show that deleveraging has started: as a result of
both credit demand and supply factors, credit
aggregates have started to fall in several EU coun-
tries (Figure 3). These credit developments help
private sector deleveraging on the one hand. But
on the other hand, the simultaneity of public and
Ja
n 
07
M
ay
 0
7
Se
p 
07
Ja
n 
08
M
ay
 0
8
Se
p 
08
Ja
n 
09
M
ay
 0
9
Se
p 
09
Ja
n 
10
M
ay
 1
0
Se
p 
10
Ja
n 
11
M
ay
 1
160
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
West
North
South
Central
East
Figure 3: Outstanding stock of loans to non-
financial corporations (September 2008 = 100)
Source: Bruegel calculation using ECB data. Note: median
values.
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BOX 1: DECOMPOSITION OF UK AND US POST SECOND WORLD WAR PUBLIC DEBT REDUCTION
In the UK and the US, the public debt ratio (general government for the UK, federal government in the US) fell
rapidly after the second world war. In 1946, the public debt was 257 percent of GDP in the UK and 122 percent
in the US.  By 1976 it had been brought down to 52 percent and 36 percent, respectively. Table 1 shows aver-
age annual growth, interest rates and primary surpluses during these three decades. GDP growth was robust
and both countries had primary surpluses (especially sizeable in the UK), but real interest rates were very low
– always below the growth rate of GDP and even negative in several years. 
Table 1: Average annual growth, interest rate and primary surplus in the UK and the US
Sources: UK: HM Treasury (debt), Office of National Statistics (budget balance, interest payments, GDP from 1948), and
measuringworth.com (GDP for 1946-48); US: White House Office of Management and Budget Historical Tables (debt, budget
balance), Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 3.1 Government Current Receipts and Expenditures (interest payments),
and Bureau of Economic Analysis (GDP). Note. Ex-post real interest rate is calculated with the so called ‘implicit interest rate’
(ie interest expenditures in a given year divided by the stock of debt at the end of the previous year) and the change in the
GDP deflator.
Our decomposition is based on the well-known, simple accounting identity for the change in the debt ratio:
where dt is the gross public debt (% GDP), rt is the real interest rate (%), gt is the real GDP growth rate (%), πt is
the inflation rate (%), st is primary surplus (% GDP) and sft is a stock-flow adjustment (% GDP). Many of these
variables are interlinked, for example, faster growth and higher surprise inflation improves the primary bal-
ance, which complicates a causal decomposition of the change in the debt ratio. Therefore, we use this simple
accounting identity to decompose the changes, ie we report (rt/(1 + gt + πt))dt–1 under the heading ‘real ex-post
interest rate’, (–gt/(1 + gt + πt))dt–1 as ‘growth’, –st as ‘primary surplus’ and sft as ‘stock-flow adjustment’. We
calculate these values for each year and sum them up for each decade we consider, in order to get their cumu-
lative impacts over decades. As Table 2 indicates, growth was an important factor in bringing down debt and it
has always more than counterbalanced the impact of the real interest rate, whenever the latter was positive.
But the real interest rate was sometimes negative, which is labelled as financial repression by Reinhart and
Sbrancia (2011).
Table 2: Contributions to UK and US post-war public debt deleveraging (% GDP)
Source: Bruegel calculation based on data sources of Table 1. Note: see the explanation of the methodology and the inter-
pretation of the numbers in the main text.
United Kingdom United States
Real GDP growth
rate (%)
Real ex-post
interest rate (%)
Primary sur-
plus (% GDP)
Real GDP growth
rate (%)
Real ex-post
interest rate (%)
Primary sur-
plus (% GDP)
1947-56 2.3 -3.0 7.4 3.6 -1.5 2.0
1957-66 2.9 0.2 4.8 4.2 1.7 1.2
1967-76 2.4 -4.6 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.6
Reduction in debt
ratio
Real ex-post
interest rate
Growth Primary surplus
Stock/flow
adjustment
United Kingdom
1947-56 -128 -58 -37 -74 41
1957-66 -45 3 -29 -48 30
1967-76 -32 -22 -15 -30 35
United States
1947-56 -58 -15 -28 -20 6
1957-66 -20 9 -21 -12 4
1967-76 -7 4 -11 -6 6
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private deleveraging is a major challenge that
could hinder economic growth and could even lead
to a vicious circle of lower growth and lower credit
– even to those companies and households that
are not overly leveraged4. Furthermore, the bank-
ing sector in Europe is itself highly leveraged and
will need to undergo sizeable corrections, not least
because of the Basel III regulations. 
There are therefore major concerns both on the
supply and the demand sides. On the supply side
potential growth in the coming years could
weaken further post the financial crisis; on the
demand side the combination of public and pri-
vate deleveraging may result in slow growth of pri-
vate aggregate demand.
In this context, improving potential growth in the
long run remains of paramount importance but at
the same time policymakers cannot afford to
ignore the interplay between supply and demand
or between short-term and longer-term develop-
ments.  
3 DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE CRISIS
Growth policies are generally and rightly regarded
as medium-term oriented. However the impact of
the Great Recession of 2009 and the current crisis
in the euro area are more than mere cyclical phe-
nomena that could be overlooked in a medium-
term analysis. In this section we analyse and
discuss the behaviour of European countries
4. There is a growing litera-
ture about ‘creditless’
recoveries (see Abiad, Del-
l'Ariccia and Li, 2011, and
references therein), which
finds that such recoveries
are not rare, but growth and
investment are lower than
in recoveries with credit;
industries more reliant on
external finance seem to
grow disproportionately
less during creditless recov-
eries; and such recoveries
are typically preceded by
banking crises and sizeable
output falls. But there are at
least two important caveats
in applying these results to
Europe. First, financing of
European firms is domi-
nantly bank based and the
level of credit to output is
much higher than in other
parts of the world. There-
fore, lack of new credit or
even a fall in outstanding
credit could drag growth
more in Europe than else-
where. Second, the litera-
ture has not paid attention
to real exchange-rate devel-
opments during creditless
recoveries. But Darvas
(2011) found that credit-
less recoveries are typically
accompanied by real effec-
tive exchange rate depreci-
ations, which can boost the
cash-flow from tradable
activities, thereby reducing
the need for bank financing.
But the southern members
of the euro area and the
eastern countries with fixed
exchange rate cannot rely
on nominal depreciation
and hence this effect
cannot work.
5. Our purpose is not to
assess the IMF’s forecast-
ing ability, rather to use
forecast changes as indica-
tive of changes to economic
perspectives. Comparison
of forecasts by the IMF
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Figure 4: GDP forecasts to 2012: October 2007 versus September 2011 (2007=100)
Source: Bruegel calculation using IMF (2007) and IMF (2011d).
‘There are major concerns both on the supply and the demand sides. Potential growth in the
coming years could weaken further post the financial crisis, while the combination of public and
private deleveraging may result in slow growth of private aggregate demand.’
during this episode and assess implications for
medium-term growth. 
3.1 Shock and recovery
A telling measure of the economic impact of the
crisis can be obtained by comparing pre-crisis and
post-crisis forecasts. While forecasts certainly
contain errors, they reflect the views about the
future that are used for economic decisions. In
Figure 4, we therefore compare forecasts to 2012
made by the IMF in October 2007 and September
20115.
Figure 4 shows that the crisis had a moderate
impact on West group countries. There, as in the
US, output fell and recovered at a broadly
unchanged pace, therefore not closing the gap
created by the recession. The impact on the North
group was more significant, owing to the greater
trade openness of the countries of this group, but
the recovery pattern is similar. The situation is
much worse in the South group where the
recession was mild in 2009, but output decline
has continued and is forecast to last at least until
2012. This widening gap is very worrying. Finally,
central European economies (with the exception
of Poland) also suffered significantly from the
crisis, and those of the East group suffered a major
shock in 2009, from which they have started to
recover but which leaves a major gap amounting
to more than 30 percent of the 2007 GDP
trajectory. 
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(2007), the European Com-
mission (2007) and the
OECD (2007) made in late
2007 indicate that the
other two institutions gave
broadly similar forecasts.
6. See Brenke, Rinne and
Zimmermann (2011).
European developments are similar to those in the
US but contrast sharply with the experience of the
14 emerging countries of Asia and Latin America
(see Appendix), where the impact was mild. In
China (not shown in the figure), pre- and post-
crisis growth trajectories are almost identical.
These emerging countries were primarily
impacted by the global trade shock, but did not
suffer from a financial crisis and started to recover
when global trade recovered.
3.2 Adjusting to the shock
At the time of economic hardship, firms relied on
different strategies to survive and to sow the
seeds of future growth. The strategies depend on
initial conditions (firms that were not competitive
enough before the crisis had no choice but to
improve), credit constraints (liquidity-constrained
firms had no choice but to cut costs), expecta-
tions about future growth (firms looking forward
to recovery had an incentive to hoard labour), eco-
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Figure 5: Output, hours worked, and productivity in the non-construction business sector (2008Q1
= 100)
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat, OECD and US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Note: median values in Panel A; US data is
for the whole business sector.
nomic policies (such as Kurzarbeit, a scheme
financed by the German government to support
part-time work and keep workers employed during
the recession6) and other factors, such as
exchange rate changes (countries that experi-
enced depreciation faced less pressure to adjust). 
To get a better picture of productivity develop-
ments in the private sector, we exclude construc-
tion and the public sector from GDP and compare
patterns of adjustment across countries. The
reason for excluding construction is that it is a
highly labour-intensive and low-productivity
sector that suffered heavily in some countries. The
shrinkage of construction may therefore give rise
to a misleading improvement in productivity data,
whereas it is entirely due to a composition effect. 
Figure 5 shows output (at constant prices), hours
worked, and the ratio of these two indicators, aver-
age productivity.
It is interesting to observe that there was a prompt
and significant productivity surge in the US – as
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a result of reducing labour input by more than the
output fall. In western and northern Europe by
contrast productivity initially fell while employ-
ment did not, which is evidence of labour-hoard-
ing. Only after a lag did productivity start to
recover, but only to a level barely above the pre-
crisis level. In central Europe productivity started
to improve from mid-2009 and the gains are
impressive. In southern Europe the fall in output
and labour input went broadly hand in hand. Pro-
ductivity essentially remained flat for the group
as a whole. 
Interpreting these differences is not straightfor-
ward. The broad evidence is that the supply side
was more damaged in Europe than in the US, at
least if one assumes that the largest part of US
unemployment is cyclical. Labour hoarding by
European firms seems to have resulted in lasting
effects on aggregate output per hour.
There are significant variations within our groups
as well. Panel B of Figure 5 shows data for the six
best performing EU countries, most of which out-
performed the US in terms of the cumulative pro-
ductivity increase in the last three years. The
sharp increase in Irish productivity is remarkable
and suggests a brighter growth outlook7. Bulgaria
ranks second, followed by three central European
countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and
Poland) and the Netherlands.
The worst performers in terms of productivity
increase are from all regional groups. These are
Greece from the South group, Romania from the
East group, Hungary from the Central group, the
UK from the North group, and Germany from the
West group. Hungary, Romania and the UK have
floating exchange rates that depreciated in 2008-
09 and have remained weak since then, which
improved external competitiveness. However,
Poland, another floater that benefited from an
exchange rate depreciation, was among the best
performers in terms of productivity increase.
German firms were already highly competitive
before the crisis and weak productivity develop-
ments to date are not necessarily worrying. What
is much more worrying is the weak performance
of Greece as its real overvaluation would call for
major improvements.
Concerning manufacturing unit labour costs
(ULC), there was prior to the crisis a surge in the
South and the East groups, but not in the other
three regions (Figure 6). Post-crisis, there is
almost no adjustment in the South group, but the
adjustment is impressive in the East group. In the
West and North groups, after a temporary increase
in 2008, ULC has fallen. Ireland again is the best
performer: ULC fell by 25 percent from 2008Q1 to
2011Q1. 
Finally, another major aspect of the adjustment is
the impact on external accounts. Figure 7 shows
that there was an abrupt adjustment in the East
group, due to a sudden stopping of capital inflows,
but that the adjustment in the South group is slow.
Private capital also stopped flowing into southern
European countries. The main reason for the lack
of faster adjustment is the massive European
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7. Note that total economy
Irish GDP fell by 10 percent
between 2008Q1 and
2009/2010, and recovery
started in 2011, but the
non-construction business
sector shown on the figure
fell only by three percent
and the recovery started in
2010.
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Central Bank (ECB) support to southern European
banks, which has offset the sudden stop in private
capital flows and contributed to financial stability.
But at the same time, ECB financing has made it
possible for these countries to delay the
adjustment, as noted by Sinn (2011). 
3.3 The special challenges of southern Europe
The evidence presented thus far confirms that
southern European countries face special chal-
lenges. Their economic convergence has reversed,
their unit labour costs have failed to improve fol-
lowing a steady rise in the pre-crisis period, and
their current account deficits have hardly
improved. Most southern European countries are
under heavy market pressure and face a vicious
circle of low and even worsening confidence and
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Figure 8: Unemployment rate (%), 2000-10
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat data. Note: median values.
‘There was an abrupt current account adjustment in the East group, due to a sudden stopping of
capital inflows, but the adjustment in the South group has been slow. The main reason for this is
the massive European Central Bank support to southern European banks.’
weak economic performance. This and the market
pressure necessitate a greater fiscal adjustment,
which again leads to a weaker economy, thereby
lowering public revenues and resulting in addi-
tional fiscal adjustment.
The social consequences of fiscal adjustment and
the weaker economy make it more difficult to
implement the adjustment programmes and
escape the vicious circle. Figure 8 shows that
unemployment has increased, especially youth
unemployment (which is also very high in the
East group). Such a high youth unemployment
rate is already leading to widespread frustration
and the rise of anti-EU political movements. 
It is interesting to contrast South group countries
with Ireland, because the latter seems to have
been able to avoid this vicious circle through a
greater flexibility to adjust to the shock by improv-
ing competitiveness and unit labour costs. The
fundamentals of the Irish economy, which are
much better than the South group countries (see
Darvas et al, 2011), have likely played important
roles in this development.  The Irish programme is
broadly on track (Table 3 on the next page), but
the outcomes and recent forecasts for Greece are
significantly worse compared to the May 2010
assumptions of the initial programme.
4 WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
The European growth agenda traditionally focuses
on horizontal structural reforms that have the
potential to improve potential output growth.
Much of this agenda is indisputable, but policy-
makers must also reflect on whether it is still
enough. In particular, two issues deserve atten-
tion in the policy discussion: the pace and com-
position of fiscal adjustments, and the potential
for more active policies.  
4.1 Revisiting the EU2020 agenda
Against the background presented in the previous
sections, what can be said of the EU2020
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agenda? Most of it clearly still makes sense. Edu-
cation, research, and the increase in participation
and employment rates are perfectly sensible
objectives in the current context, and the goals of
ensuring climate-friendly and inclusive growth are
also appropriate.
Implementing this agenda requires a significant
stepping-up of efforts. Progress so far is very
uneven within the EU. While indicators related to
the five main EU2020 targets are readily available
(eg Eurostat), in Table 4 we construct a
scoreboard, based on the methodology of IMF
(2010c) which was also used in Allard and
Evaraert (2010), which assesses the various
structural indicators in 2005 and currently. These
indicators do not relate to all five main EU2020
targets, but to certain aspects of growth that could
be improved with structural reforms. In its
progress with structural reforms, the North group
is unsurprisingly much further ahead than the
West group and, especially, the South group,
which is severely lagging on all criteria. While
countries under a programme face very strong
external pressure to reform, the main challenge is
to foster improvements in countries such as Italy,
that are performing poorly, but are not under
IMF/EU programmes. 
4.2 Composition of fiscal adjustments
The vast majority of European countries are facing
major fiscal challenges. Assessments of the
details vary, but concur in considering that reach-
ing sustainable budgetary positions will require
exceptionally large and sustained adjustments
amounting to more than 10 percentage points of
GDP in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK
(IMF, 2011). A large number of European countries
are expected to need adjustments of the order of 5
to 10 percent of GDP. 
There is a broad consensus that these adjust-
ments should be as growth-friendly as possible.
This implies, first, striking the right balance
between revenue-based and spending-based
adjustments; and second, selecting from revenue
and spending measures the least detrimental to
growth. Although there is no ready-made general
metric to design growth-friendly adjustment pack-
ages, it is widely accepted that revenue measures
tend to involve more adverse supply-side effects
than spending measures; that tax measures that
broaden the tax base or do not directly distort
incentives to work and invest are preferable; and
that spending cuts should preserve public invest-
ment in infrastructure, education and research. 
These simple criteria can be used to assess the
measures planned and implemented in EU coun-
tries. An appropriate starting point is a late 2010
IMF survey of country exit strategies conducted
for G20 members and a group of countries (includ-
ing Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) facing
exceptionally high adjustments (IMF, 2010d). This
comprehensive survey suggested that virtually all
countries facing medium-scale adjustment
(between 5 and 10 percent of GDP starting from
2009 positions) were planning expenditure-based
adjustment whereas countries facing large-scale
adjustments (above 10 percent of GDP) were rely-
ing more on mixed strategies. Interestingly, no
country was planning a revenue-based adjust-
ment. Second, most countries were envisaging
structural reforms of the government sector aimed
at reducing the size of the public service and lim-
iting the growth of social transfers. Overall, cuts in
public investment amounted to about one-sev-
enth of total spending cuts. Third, planned tax
measures gave priority to broadening tax bases as
opposed to increasing taxes, especially in the field
of direct taxation of labour and capital, and to
increased consumption taxes. This was prima
facie evidence of the governments’ intention to
make fiscal adjustment as growth-friendly as pos-
sible. 
The worsening conditions on government bond
markets changed the course of events completely.
Under increasing pressure, governments had to
front-load planned measures, or even to adopt
emergency measures in an attempt to meet mar-
kets’ apparently insatiable demand for fiscal con-
solidation. The belt tightening was not limited to
programme countries (Greece, Ireland and Portu-
gal) but also extended to Italy, Spain and France,
which all approved extraordinary fiscal consolida-
tion measures in August and September. 
Table 5 provides evidence on the composition of
the recent consolidation measures. It is apparent
that giving priority to growth has often given way
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Greece Original version of IMF/EU Programme 11.1% GDP 
(May 2010) 47.8%
expenditure
0.36 16.2% structural
reforms (*)revenues
Reinforced Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 12% GDP 
(June 2011) (on top of what already implemented) 
0.525 0.475
expenditure revenues
2nd emergency round (September 2011) 1.1% GDP 
(Property tax on electricity-powered buildings)
--
1
revenues
Portugal IMF/EU EFF Programme 10.6% GDP 
(May 2011) 0.67 0.33
expenditure revenues
Emergency measures due to fiscal slippages 1.1% of GDP
(August 2011)
--
1
revenues
Spain Emergency measures (August 2011) 0.5% GDP
~50% ~50%
expenditure revenues
Emergency measures (September 2011) 0.2% GDP
--
1
revenues
Italy Fiscal Consolidation Package (August 2011) 3.6% GDP
<50% >50%
expenditure revenues
France August 2011 0.6% of GDP
--
>80%
revenues
to expediency. In all countries surveyed, recent
adjustments are either mixed or revenue-based. It
is probable that they are also markedly growth-
friendly in the choice of detailed measures. 
Evidence thus indicates that the growth-adverse
impact of the precipitous adjustment plans that
are being implemented in response to market
strains are likely to go beyond standard Keyne-
sian effects and also result in potentially adverse
supply-side effects. This is in part unavoidable. But
good intentions are of little help if they are
reneged on under the pressure of events. Whereas
there is no magic bullet to address this problem,
at least a close monitoring of national plans within
the context of the ECOFIN Council is called for. 
Table 5: Composition of recent fiscal adjustments in selected euro-area countries
Source: Bruegel based on IMF (2010a, 2010d, 2011a, 2011b), Greek Ministry of Finance (2011), ECB (2011), Spanish Min-
istry of Finance (2011a, 2011b), and news reports in Financial Times, Sole24Ore and LaVoce.info. Note. (*) In the case of
Greece, in addition to direct revenue and expenditure measures, IMF (2010a) included a third category called Structural
reforms, which comprise lower expenditures resulting from improvements from budgetary control and processes and higher
revenues due to improvements in tax administration.
4.3 Growth policy under constraints
A key challenge for several euro-area countries is
how to implement growth strategies in the context
of 'wrong' prices. When prices perform their
economic role they convey information to agents
about the profitability of working or investing in
various sectors; this in principle leads to socially
optimal choices. In this context the main task of
policies is to boost the supply of labour and capital
and to create a level playing field for employees
and firms. 
Things are different, however, when prices are
'wrong'8, which is particularly relevant in the Euro-
pean context because of real exchange-rate mis-
8. This traditionally hap-
pens when they fail to take
account of externalities.
Environmental costs here
are a well-known example
but there are other external-
ities, either positive (when
firms contribute to knowl-
edge) or negative (when
they fail to take into
account the impact of indi-
vidual decisions on aggre-
gate financial stability). In
this type of context more
hands-on policies, including
industrial policies, can be
advisable, as argued in
Aghion et al (2011).
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alignments within the euro area and in countries
in a fixed exchange-rate regime. Countries that
experienced major domestic demand expansion
in the first ten years of EMU must reallocate capi-
tal and labour to the traded-good sector in spite of
a still overvalued real exchange rate. Without
policy-driven incentives, private decisions are
likely to lead to suboptimal factor allocation in this
sector, ultimately hampering growth. 
Figure 9 gives European Commission (2010) esti-
mates of real exchange rate misalignments in the
euro area for 2009 – the latest available estimate
– and the changes in real effective exchange rates
since then. The figures presented for the mis-
alignment are the average of two measures, one
based on current account norms and the other
based on the stabilisation of the net foreign-asset
positions. Estimates for 2009 provide lower mis-
alignment than estimates for 2008, so we are
erring on the side of caution. What is apparent is
that significant misalignments prevail, because
the real depreciation from 2009 to mid-2011 in
the most overvalued countries (except Ireland)
was limited and broadly similar or less than the
depreciation in Germany, the biggest euro-area
country that already had an undervalued real
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Figure 9: Real exchange rate misalignments of
euro-area countries in 2009 and adjustment
since (%)
Source: Bruegel calculation using data from European
Commission (2010) on misalignment and ECB data on real
effective exchange rate (apart from the ULC-based exchange
rate of Portugal, which is from the Eurostat and available only
till 2010Q4).
exchange rate in 2009. Real exchange rate mis-
alignments result in meaningful distortions in pri-
vate decisions. 
Furthermore, the correction of these imbalances
is exceedingly slow. In the previous section we
looked at the evolution of unit labour costs and
concluded that with the exception of Ireland, cor-
rection has barely started. The persistence of inad-
equate prices is bound to be detrimental to
efficient capital accumulation and to weigh on
potential output growth. 
In this context policies that help correct distor-
tions are an integral part of the growth agenda.
Such policies may involve:
• Product and labour market reforms (ie improve-
ments in several areas assessed in Table 4)
that increase the responsiveness of the wage-
price system to market disequilibria and help
bring about the required correction in relative
prices; 
• Tax-based internal devaluations that foster an
adjustment in relative prices; 
• Temporary wage/price subsidies or tax breaks
targeted at the traded good sector that help
restore competitiveness; 
• Industrial policy measures such as sectoral
subsidies that favour accumulation in certain
sectors.
EU-IMF sponsored adjustment programmes in
Greece, Portugal and Spain include structural com-
ponents, some of which include some of the meas-
ures listed above. However in the context of
heightened bond-market tensions the focus of pol-
icymakers’ attention tends to be budgetary con-
solidation. Growth will only return, however, if the
structural agenda is given sufficient weight and if
means are mobilised to support it. In countries
that benefit from Structural Funds, especially
Greece and Portugal where they are sizeable, we
follow Marzinotto (2011) and advocate temporary
reallocations to support the growth and competi-
tiveness aspects of the programmes. Examples of
growth-friendly policies that could be supported
through this channel include credit for SMEs and
temporary wage subsidies aiming at restoring
competitiveness. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have revisited the European
growth issue in the light of recent developments.
We agree with the World Bank (Gill and Raiser,
2011) that Europe can build on its past achieve-
ments, but we emphasise that it cannot afford to
remain complacent about its recent and current
economic performance. For most of the continent,
business-as-usual policies are likely to deliver
insufficient growth to ensure the viability of the
social model, which is in any case under threat
because of ageing populations. The challenge of
reviving growth is heightened by the deteriorating
performance of southern Europe and the very lim-
ited, or even disappointing, adjustment these
countries were able to achieve during the last
three years. The single most remarkable success
of the EU, its ability to foster convergence, is under
threat. In ‘new Europe’ convergence is still hap-
pening, but it should be strengthened. 
On this basis our main policy conclusions are:
• The growth agenda is of paramount importance
in the current context. The Polish EU presidency
should be commended for having selected it as
a priority and the detailed proposals in Polish
presidency (2011) should be considered seri-
ously;
• The EU2020 agenda remains broadly appropri-
ate, but its governance should be improved to
achieve more rapid progress on structural reform
in countries that are under threat of falling
behind, making use of the new instruments
embodied in the European Semester9; structural
reforms in general, and reforms of product and
labour markets in particular, are of paramount
importance especially in countries with weak
scores and overvalued real exchange rates;
• Tax-based internal devaluations, temporary
wage-price subsidies or tax breaks could help
restore competitiveness;
• The EU should urgently speed up the realloca-
tion of Structural and Cohesion Funds in coun-
tries under programme to support growth and
competitiveness, for which a general political
will may be there, but action is lacking. Special
legislation is needed to turn principles into
swift action;
• The proposals for issuing ‘European project
bonds’ by the Commission or increasing the
capacity of the EIB, to fund investment
throughout Europe, should be considered and
implemented;  
• The growth agenda needs to be put in context.
It is of little use to set objectives for the
medium term if governments depart from them
under the pressure of events. The composition
of fiscal adjustments is a case in point in this
respect; 
• The policy toolkit should be broadened to
include policies that help direct resources to
the traded goods sectors in a situation when
prices give inadequate signals to economic
agents. This implies a more hands-on approach,
including industrial policies, than under the tra-
ditional agenda.
Europe is so integrated that domestic measures
may not be sufficient to restore growth in partic-
ular countries when the rest of the EU is sinking,
even when supported by EU-level initiatives. The
euro area’s lingering sovereign debt and banking
crisis is the most important factor in driving con-
fidence down, even in those countries where fiscal
sustainability has not been questioned. There is a
negative feedback loop between the crisis and
growth, and without effective solutions to deal
with the crisis, growth is unlikely to resume. 
9. See an assesment of the
first European Semester in
Marzinotto, Wolff and
Hallerberg (2011).
‘The most remarkable success of the EU, its ability to foster convergence, is under threat. The
growth challenge is heightened by the deteriorating performance of southern Europe and the
very limited, or even disappointing, adjustment these countries have been able to achieve.’
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APPENDIX: COUNTRY GROUPS
Pre-crisis developments, current difficulties and
prospects vary widely across EU countries. To sim-
plify matters, we define five major groups, which
we name according to the cardinal points, and dis-
cuss the diverse challenges along these five
groups:
• West: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Netherlands;
• South: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain;
• North: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, UK;
• Central: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia;
• East: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria,
Romania.
We leave aside the three least populous EU coun-
tries, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, because they
have some unique futures and do not fit well to our
groups. To control for relative sizes, we use medi-
ans for each country group.
Certainly, our groups are heterogeneous. For
example, Ireland faces different challenges to
Sweden, and more generally the Scandinavian and
Anglo-Saxon economic and social models are dif-
ferent. Yet the North group countries share simi-
larities, such as good governance indicators and
low structural reform gaps (see Table 4). These
countries were also impacted harder by the initial
phase of the crisis than countries in our West
group, before bouncing back faster (Figure 10).
The countries that joined the EU in 2004-07 are
also heterogeneous. But by analysing in the detail
their growth model in Becker et al (2010) we
came to the conclusion that the five central Euro-
pean countries had developments remarkably dif-
ferent from the three Baltic countries, Bulgaria and
Romania and their challenges also differ.
For comparison, in some figures we also show
data for the US and China, and for a group of 14
countries from Asia and Latin America (not includ-
ing China and India):
Asia and Latin America 14: six countries from Asia
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan
and Thailand) and eight from Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay).
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Figure 10: GDP growth from 2007 to 2009 and
from 2009 to 2013 in EU15 countries
Source: Bruegel using data from the IMF (2011d).
